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The Confluence of Law and
Antebellum Black Literature
LAWYERLY DISCOURSE AS A RHETORIC
OF EMPOWERMENT
Andrea McArdle*
Abstract. This article argues that the acculturation of black Bostonians to the rhetoric of the law dur-
ing the Revolutionary era was constitutive and sustaining. The article examines how three pivotal
Boston-based antebellum authors Prince Hall, David Walker, and Maria Stewart-appropriated
the rhetoric of legal pleading used in Revolutionary-era government petitions and freedom suits
(petitioning for redress of grievances, closely analyfingprecedential texts, distilling ideas into rea-
soned argument, adducingfactualproof, the pointed use of narrative and the interrogative mode)
toproduce a literature of complaint and rights-assertion. The centralpremise of the article is that
antebellum black texts used these lawyerly discursive practices ironically, as an empowering move,
to draw attention to the disparity between the rhetoric of rights and actual practice. Because these
"lawyer's words" called upon the authority and salience of the law as a source of rights in theprocess
of claiming rights, lawyerly discourse served a sustaining strategy of empowerment for blackpeople,
and captured the sense of irony in their experience.
Antebellum black literature was preeminently a project of public discourse, an
externalization of African Americans' struggle to achieve civil and political
rights under law.' Its public petitions, pamphlets, tracts, speeches, and news-
paper essays, as well as sermons and autobiographical narratives of men and
women who endured and later escaped slavery, formed a genre of protest that
was crafted with a sense of mission and an intense consciousness of audience.
Much of this publicly engaged literature, particularly the notable work that
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appeared in Boston during the early antebellum period, critiqued legal and
social inequalities and advocated a strategy of self-help in a language that res-
onated with the modes and forms of law. Drawing on James Boyd White's
conception of law as "a set of terms and texts and understandings," 2 this article
posits that rhetorical features conventionally associated with legal advocacy
constitute a lawyerly discourse, a set of texts and methods deriving from the
process of legal reasoning and argumentation.3 It argues that the acculturation
of black Bostonians to the rhetoric of the law during the Revolutionary era
was constitutive and sustaining. Specifically, the article examines how three
pivotal Boston-based black authors from the early antebellum period-Prince
Hall, David Walker, and Maria Stewart-appropriated the rhetoric of legal
pleading used in Revolutionary-era government petitions and freedom suits
(petitioning for redress of grievances, closely analyzing precedential texts,
distilling ideas into reasoned argument, adducing factual proof, using narra-
tive and the interrogative mode)4 to produce a literature of complaint and
rights-assertion.
The central premise is that antebellum black texts used these lawyerly dis-
cursive practices ironically, as an empowering move, to draw attention to
disparity between the rhetoric of rights and actual practice.5 The literary
production of these antebellum cultural figures is addressed in terms of the
question posed by historian Vincent Harding: "What is the role of the word-
the spoken word, the preached word, the whispered-in-the-nighttime word,
the written word, the published word in the fight for black freedom? 6 And
consideration is given to literary scholar Jon-Christian Suggs's suggestive
response: black literature has provided an "interrogative text," a "parallel nar-
rative often quite at odds with the canonical narrative of white American
life." This interrogation locates the irony inherent in the lives of American
blacks in the dissonance between American precept and practice concerning
access to civil and political rights.8 Suggs's use of irony and interrogation
inform the argument of this article, as does Harding's attention to the role of
language.
Because "lawyer's words" call upon the authority and salience of law as a
source of rights in the process of claiming rights, lawyerly discourse has served
a sustaining strategy of empowerment for black people, and captured the sense
of irony in their experience. This article introduces this theme in relation to
the Revolutionary-era discursive traditions of public legal challenges to slav-
ery and racial inequality, and then examines the work of three Boston-based
184
McArdle • The Confluence of Law and Antebellum Black Literature
antebellum authors. First, it considers the hortatory addresses of Prince Hall,
the founder of the African Masonic Lodge in Boston, who did much to "pub-
licize" a black voice9 in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Hall
anticipated later abolitionists in his critique of racial inequality, call for com-
munity solidarity, and elaboration of blacks' moral superiority to whites. The
article then examines the lawyerly methods and impact of David Walker's
controversial Appeal to the Coloured Citiens of the World, published in three
editions in Boston in 1829 and 1830. l" Circulated widely among free blacks in
Boston and elsewhere in the North, the Appeal was also smuggled into the
South, where its call for resistance, framed in terms of divine providence, has
been posited as a possible catalyst for Nat Turner's storied slave rebellion in
1831.11 Finally, the article discusses author and lecturer Maria Stewart's multi-
ple roles as critic of white institutions and advocate, exhorter, and goad to Bos-
ton's free blacks. In the early 183os, Stewart continued Hall's and Walker's
efforts to contribute to an antebellum black public sphere, an albeit limited
"discursive space" in which free blacks engaged in reasoned discussion about
access to legal rights and political status.l2
"WE HAVE IN COMMON WITH ALL OTHER MEN A
NATURAL RIGHT TO OUR FREEDOM": ENGAGING THE
LEGAL CULTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY-ERA BOSTON 13
The "lawyerly" character of early antebellum black literature had its prove-
nance in Boston's well-developed tradition of public advocacy, and in black
Bostonians' participation in the city's charged Revolutionary-era legal cul-
ture. In that culture, republican discourse invoked the law as a mechanism for
vindicating rights. 4 As the Boston-area colonial resistance movement in the
1770s marshaled a growing literature of argument, pointed questioning, and
assertions of aggrievement against the legitimacy of British rule, 5 Boston's
black community adopted similar rhetorical strategies. Free and enslaved
blacks framed challenges to bondage in petitions to government officials 6 that
drew attention to the logical disjunction between domestic slavery and the
colonists' own objections to political bondage to Britain. 17 At the same time,
the comparative openness of the Massachusetts courts to the claims of persons
of color 8 encouraged enslaved blacks to use the litigation process to pursue
freedom. "
185
Law & Literature • Volume 1 7, Number 2
Suing for Freedom
An important early link between black cultural experience and legal discourse
was the freedom suit. The legal position of slaves in Massachusetts was com-
plicated by their hybrid character: slaves were taxable, inheritable, and subject
to judgment levy as property." Nonetheless, slaves could invoke some of the
legal protections to which freemen in Massachusetts were entitled, among
them a right of personal security against assault or corporal punishment,"' a
right to possess property,z" and a right to participate in judicial proceedings on
the same terms as free members of the community.23 This participation encom-
passed both a capacity to testify in legal proceedings as a non-party witness, 4
and a right to maintain a lawsuit on one's own behalf.2" Unlike the rule in other
colonies, Massachusetts did not limit the testimonial capacity of blacks to cases
involving other blacks; rather, blacks in Massachusetts-both slave and free-
were permitted to testify against, or on behalf of, white persons as well.2 6
Lawsuits contesting slavery were initiated at least from the beginning of the
eighteenth century. As early as 1701, for example, a slave of Judge Saffin of
Boston successfully secured his liberty after suing his owner for failing to
manumit him as he had promised. 27 The incidence of freedom suits became
more frequent in the years preceding the Revolutionary War,2" and it seems
fair to presume that they were spurred on at least in part by the political rhet-
oric of the time.29 Although the personal voices of the slave-plaintiffs were, at
best, mediated by their legal representatives in the litigation process, black
Bostonians' involvement in the discursive practices of pleading and argument
opened up an important avenue of cultural expression.
Typically, these suits were grounded in a theory of trespass to the person,
and sought recovery of monetary damages for false imprisonment, 0 or assault
and battery.3' The gravamen of a trespass claim was that a right of personal or
bodily integrity-here, liberty-had been violated.32 Arguments of counsel
were not consistent, however, in identifying the source of the right."3 Nor do
extant records offer illumination of the grounds for judicial rulings.34 Frag-
mentary notes of John Adams's observation of, or actual participation in, suits
from the 176os and 177os, discussed below, provide some insight into the rhe-
torical possibilities for arguing these claims.
In some cases, slave-plaintiffs' counsel invoked principles of contract law.
In the case of Caesar v. Taylor, for example, originating in the Essex Inferior
Court, Newburyport, in 1771, the plaintiff, Caesar, based his claim to freedom
largely on a contract in which his master had agreed to release the plaintiffupon
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the payment of a sum of money, a substantial part of which had been paid;
instead, the owner, Taylor, had sold Caesar to another." John Adams, appear-
ing for the owner, cited precedent for the proposition that "negroes are pre-
sumed to be slaves and must make their freedom appear."36 Other challenges
to a party's enslaved condition were based on ancestry. In Slew v. Whipple, a
suit brought in the Essex Superior Court, Salem, in 1766, plaintiff's attorney
Benjamin Kent argued that Jenny Slew was by reputation the child of a white
mother and a Negro father.3 7 Adams's notes of the proceedings indicate that
Judge Cushing, one member of the panel of judges hearing the case, was
persuaded by that notion, applying the theory that the child's condition is
controlled by that of her mother."
Challenges on such grounds assumed the legitimacy of slavery,39 but coun-
sel for slave-plaintiffs at times did elaborate more nuanced arguments, com-
bining aspects of natural law, common-law precedent, and general principles
of interpretation. Plaintiff's counsel adopted such an approach in Caesar v.
Greenleaf 4 There, the attorney for the slaveowner cited the acceptance of slav-
ery in ancient cultures and in colonial practice as a normative basis for
enslavement.4' John Lowell, Caesar's attorney, countered that "the precepts of
revealed law, golden rule of the gospel are that we are not to sell our brethren,
that we are to do as we would be done unto. "4 Moreover, without an explicit
foundation for slavery in the law of the province, "liberty is not to be taken
from him by implication of law."43 Nor, Lowell argued, was defendant's reli-
ance on customary practice well founded. The law of the province was within
recorded memory, and established that slavery was permitted only in the case
of consent or capture "in lawful war." 44
Lowell's closely reasoned argument was multilayered and rhetorically
complex. At one level it hewed closely to familiar points of doctrine, rooting
the discussion in the common law, which, as he emphasized, "abhors slav-
ery. '4 Yet Lowell also infused his argument with biblical resonances ("we
are to do as we would be done unto") and idioms (the reference to "breth-
ren"). 46 And he explicitly introduced the theoretics of natural rights, both in
the insistence upon customary practice that is "reasonable" and "just," 47 and
in his argument that Caesar had a natural right to be free in order to assume
responsibility for a family.48 Although we can only speculate whether strate-
gies of argument premised upon conceptions of natural law influenced the
outcome of the suit, the case resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the slave-
plaintiff.49
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The history of one set of cases, the Quock Walker litigation, suggests that
courts were receptive to natural rights theory. Placing in issue the legality of
Walker's enslavement, this cluster of suits resulted in a broad ruling that con-
strued Massachusetts' recently adopted constitution as conferring rights that
were irreconcilable with slavery.50 The procedural context for that ruling was
a criminal indictment charging Walker's master, Jennison, with assault and
battery.5 ' Anticipating a constitutional challenge to slavery, defense counsel
argued that, because the 1780 constitution had not banned slavery, there was
no basis on which to read a prohibition into the document. 52 Charging the jury
to find Jennison guilty on the evidence, Chief Justice Cushing interpreted ar-
ticle one of the state constitution as abrogating slavery "by the granting of
rights and privileges wholly incompatible and repugnant to its existence."53
This article, the Declaration of Rights, provided that "[a]ll men are born free
& equal, & have certain natural, essential, & unalienable rights; among which
maybe reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties;
that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking
and obtaining their safety and happiness."54 On the basis of this instruction,
the jury found Jennison guilty as charged.55
Acknowledging that the state's constitution did not explicitly outlaw slav-
ery, Cushing noted that any supposed right to hold slaves was similarly lack-
ing an affirmative sanction in the law, but rather was the outgrowth of custom. 5
Cushing then posited transcendent "rights and privileges" as preemptive of
customary practice. 7 Whether or not it can be said that a declaration in the
context of a jury charge had the legal effect of dismantling slavery (in practice,
slavery persisted for some time in Massachusetts after the ruling in Walker's
case),55 the ruling resonated with the growing public opposition to the institu-
tion.59 In rhetorical effect, the ruling came to serve as the symbol of the elimi-
nation of slavery in Massachusetts, and contributed to the robust idiom of
rights associated with its Revolutionary-era legal culture.
Petitioning for Rights
The resort to legal institutions within the black community was not limited to
the courts. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, blacks in Massa-
chusetts, and particularly Boston, directed petitions to legislative or executive
officials enumerating their grievances." In substantive scope, these petitions
advocated dismantling the slave trade, 6' protested the denial of suffrage and
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access to public education to taxpaying blacks," and sought support for plans
to emigrate to Africa.63 Arguing the dissonance between the persistence of slav-
ery and an enlightened polity,64 these petitions as a genre65 afforded Massachu-
setts' black population considerable scope for articulating aggrievement.
Reliance on petitions to government gained considerably during the I77os,
suggesting that the black community was both conscious of, and responsive
to, an increasingly contentious legal and political culture.6 The petition of
"Felix" to the colonial governor and the legislature in January 1773 is sugges-
tive: its self-deprecating tonality lulls the reader into a false sense of the writer's
ambitions. Though "presuming not to dictate" to his addressees, the writer
pointedly asserted that the brutalizing effects of slavery were inimical to "every
moral Virtue except Patience. '6 7 When the petitioner asks, "How many have
had.., their lives imbittered with this most intollerable Reflection, that...
neither they nor their children to all Generations, shall ever be able to do, or to
possess and enjoy any thing, no, not even Life itself," the tonal disjunction in
the text becomes marked.68 The insistence of the question posed, and the
unabashed expression of complaint, impart a sense of futility that suggests
despair hovering just below the surface of his words.
Capturing the emotional tone of lamentation and estrangement character-
istic of a black jeremiad, 9 the petitioner sheds all pretense of restraint: "We
have no Property! We have no Wives! No Children! We have no City! No
Country!" 70 The repetition of the exclamatory mode, and the alternating pat-
tern of complete sentence followed by a fragment ("No Children!" "No
Country") convey a peremptoriness, a sense of urgency, as well as a poignant
mournfulness. In another tonal shift, the petitioner goes on to pledge submis-
sion to the will of God, and obedience to earthly masters. 7' Concluding, the
petition articulates the normative standard that should guide its addressees,
that is, "what is wise, just, and good." 72 The inclusion of justice in the calculus
resonated with the theoretics of natural rights, which, as noted, was the intel-
lectual and rhetorical foundation for much of the public discourse of this
period.73
As political disaffection intensified in the 177os, the rhetoric of natural rights
became more marked in petitions from enslaved blacks, as it did more gener-
ally in the political debate concerning the legitimacy of British rule.74 The
extent to which these black petitioners appropriated Revolutionary discourse
to their own production appeared tellingly in two related petitions, the first
from May 1774, the second dated January 1777. Emphasizing their status as
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men, the authors of the earlier petition asserted that "we have in common
with all other men a natural right to our freedom," and, "as .. .a freeborn
Pepel ... have never forfeited this Blessing by aney compact or agreement
whatever."" They reminded colonial governor Thomas Gage and the provin-
cial legislature that they had been "unjustly dragged by the cruel hand of power
from our dearest friends and sum of us stolen from the bosoms of our tender
Parents... deprived of every thing that hath a tendency to make life even tol-
erable."76 Using synecdoche ("the cruel hand of power") to create an image of
the wrenching physicality of abduction, and anaphora to pose a series of ques-
tions (each beginning with the construction "How can"), the petitions under-
scored the unreasonableness of laws by which some men purported to enslave
others:
[H]ow can a slave perform the duties of a husband to a wife or parent to his child
... How can the wife submit themselves to there husbands in all things How can
the child obey their parents in all things... how can the master and the slave be
said to fulfil that command Live in love let brotherly Love cotuner and abound
Beare yea one anothers Bordenes How can the master be said to Beare my Borden
when he Beares me down whith the Have chanes of slavery.
The interrogative sentence structure and repetition of the verb "to bear" cou-
pled with progressively more onerous objects/consequences for the writers
(from bearing one another's burdens to my burden to bearing me down) call
attention to the plight of enslaved people. The unpunctuated construction cre-
ates an impression of urgency and, in the end, there is no escaping the anger
and the anguish crystallized in the petitioners' relentless questioning. As one
question spills over into the next, without pause for answers, it becomes clear
that the questions are unanswerable, and that only the questions matter.
The later petition, from 1777, appears to have been a reworking of the 1774
document.7 ' However, the petition's rhetorical power is assured, both in its
pointed analogy and contrast between the position of enslaved blacks and that
of the (white) colonists vis-fi-vis Britain 7 and in emphasizing the irreconcil-
ability of slavery with revolutionary values.80 Recognizing the similar impulses
that actuated the colonists and enslaved blacks in their quests for liberation
(neither were "without spirit to Resent the unjust endeavors of others to reduce
them to a state of bondage and Subjection"),8' the petition identified the critical
distinction between them-the distinction between "A Live of Slavery,"82 and
the colonists' use of slavery as metaphor and political symbol.
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In tone and content, these Revolutionary-era petitions exemplified a devel-
oping discourse of protest and aggrievement, exploiting the logical disjunc-
tion of the colonists' tolerance of domestic slavery while they protested
against their own political bondage to Britain.83 The petitions afforded expres-
sive possibilities for the black communities in Boston and other cities in Mas-
sachusetts; they were a means of appealing to government and a vehicle for
building a "culture of argument," to borrow White's conception of the law
itself.4 The process of shaping a culture continued in the years following the
Revolutionary War, both at a local level and later as a national movement:85
leaders of Boston's emergent black community critiqued American institu-
tional practices in modes of address linked to the discursive traditions of peti-
tions and freedom suits. By appropriating these lawyerly discursive practices,
black cultural production associated itself with the law's claim to rationality
and moral authority.
"WE MUST BE GOOD SUBJECTS TO THE LAWS OF THE
LAND . . . GIVING HONOUR TO WHOM HONOUR IS
DUE": THE CULTURAL ACTIVISM OF PRINCE HALL 86
The legal and political environment in post-Revolutionary War Massachu-
setts afforded ample cause for blacks to resort to the rhetoric of the law. The
position of free black people in the post-war period remained marginal, even
after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts essentially outlawed slavery
in 1783, declaring it to be inconsistent with the Massachusetts constitution.8 7 In
fact, Massachusetts' white population did not embrace its black community.
Blacks' civil liberties were limited,8 and available economic opportunities were
similarly truncated.89 In the depressed post-war economy, anxiety over com-
petition for scarce jobs prompted aggressive behavior against blacks in Boston.
And a restrictive notion of polity-based on a shared ethnocultural heritage-
kept blacks outside the definition of citizenship.' Under these circumstances,
free blacks-spared the total brutalization of slavery but denied equality of
civil status and economic opportunity with white Americans-continued in
the posture of public complainants.92
The early involvement of black people in Massachusetts, and particularly
Boston, in the discursive conventions of the law afforded a rhetorical frame of
reference for their subsequent literary output: examined for structure, theme,
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tone, and voice, their post-Revolutionary War cultural production used rhe-
torical features associated with Boston's public legal discourse of the 1770s
and early 1780s." Prince Hall's use of the hortatory oration as a filter for social
protest reflected this discursive character. Described by one literary scholar
as "in no sense a man of letters,"94 Hall nonetheless was preeminent among
black Bostonians, one of the first "black public men" in the new nation,95 whose
contributions to public discourse were of a sufficiently literary quality to war-
rant inclusion in several collections and histories of early African American
writing."
As Hall was instrumental in crafting a number of the revolutionary-era
petitions for the black community,97 it seems inevitable that his later work
would bear the earmarks of legal discourse. After the war, Hall continued to
draft petitions, now to the Massachusetts state legislature, for financial support
for an African colonization effort, and to draw attention to the abduction and
sale into slavery of three free blacks.9 In fact, Hall called upon his skill and
experience as a petitioner to aid the establishment and later proliferation of
African Masonic orders.9 After being granted membership in a Masonic lodge
attached to a regiment of British soldiers in Boston in 1775, but unable to
secure admission into the white Massachusetts lodge, Hall petitioned for and
was ultimately granted a charter from England in 1784, and used that official
status to charter African lodges in other communities in New England and
the Northeast.'9 ' Hall's African Lodge, in turn, used the device of the petition
to request legislative aid for black education"' and to end slave trading in
Massachusetts. 102
During the last decade of the eighteenth century, Hall authored inspira-
tional addresses to the lodge membership that drew on biblical allusions, his-
torical scholarship, and a finely-tuned ironic stance through which he smug-
gled in a discourse of complaint. In an address from 1792, Hall demonstrated
that even a seemingly innocuous adjuration to obey the laws of the polity
could become an opportunity for subtle critique: "Again we must be good
subjects to the laws of the land in which we dwell, giving honour to our lawful
Governors and Magistrates, giving honour to whom honour is due."' The
use of "lawful" to modify the Governors and Magistrates meriting "honour"
seems consonant with the general tenor of the passage: it is desirable to observe
the law. Yet the language is open to another, more subversive reading: the ana-
phoric use of "giving honour" at the beginning of sequential clauses under-
lines an intent to delineate the scope of authority narrowly; it is appropriate to
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obey those who exercise their authority lawfully, and no others. Hall's skill in
disguising an invitation to disobey authority allowed him a safety margin of
ambiguity, in which he avoided an openly seditious message.
Typically, Hall embedded social protest in digressions and tonal shifts. In
this same address, Hall expressed concern that his listening audience might be
unable to understand his historical discourse, given their lack of opportunity
for an education. He then segued to the real subject of the passage, which was
to remind his audience that their children similarly lacked educational oppor-
tunity-although blacks were taxed to support public education. 114 Recount-
ing the history of the Masonic order during the early and middle ages, Hall
used the past as a springboard for reflections on the present:
Query, Whether at that day, when there was an African church, and perhaps the
largest Christian church on earth, whether there was no African of that order; or
whether, if they were all whites, they would refuse to accept them as their fellow
Christians and brother Masons; or whether there were any so weak, or rather so
foolish, as to say, because they were blacks, that would make their lodge or army
too common or cheap? Sure this was not our conduct in the late war; for then
they marched shoulder to shoulder, brother soldier and brother soldier, to the
field of battle; let who will answer; he that despises a black man for the sake of his
colour, reproacheth his Maker. 5
Posing a question in the discursive tradition of the law, elaborated and rein-
forced rhetorically by the anaphoric use of "whether," Hall's "query" seems
less scrupulous about disguising its emotional content than the earlier passage,
as he alludes here to his own recent exposure to racial discrimination: at the
hands of the Massachusetts order of Masons, which had not "invited or con-
sidered" blacks for a charter;. 6 by the colonial army, which had rebuffed offers
to have slaves serve in their ranks;0 7 and by the Commonwealth, which appar-
ently refused the services of Hall and the Masonic membership to assist in sub-
duing Shays' Rebellion,0 8 and refused a request to provide financial support to
educate black people.0 9 Yet emotion did not divert Hall from his craft. In his
repetition of the term "brother," Hall connected the passage thematically to
earlier references to Christian brotherhood and the Samaritan of the gospel
account. And by concluding with another biblical allusion, Hall transmuted a
surfeit of personal emotion into conventional religious discourse, compatible
with the content and tone of his ostensible text.
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A 1797 address to the African Lodge showcases Hall's pointed use of the
interrogative mode and precise visual images to draw attention to the racial
oppression and lack of humanity entailed in slavery:
Among these numerous sons and daughters of distress, I shall begin with our
friends and brethren; and first, let us see them dragg'd from their native country
by the iron hand of tyranny and oppression, from their dear friends and connec-
tions, with weeping eyes and aching hearts, to a strange land and strange people,
whose tender mercies are cruel; and there to bear the iron yoke of slavery & cru-
elty, till death as a friend shall relieve them. And must not the unhappy condi-
tion of these our fellow-men draw forth our hearty prayer and wishes for their
deliverance from these merchants and traders, whose characters you have in the
xviii chap. of the Revelations, 1i, 12, & 13 verses, and who knows but these same
sort of traders may in a short time, in the like manner, bewail the loss of the Afri-
can traffick, to their shame and confusion: and if I mistake not, it now begins to
dawn in some of the West-India islands, which puts me in mind of a nation (that
I have somewhere read of) called Ethiopeans, that cannot change their skin: But
God can and will change their conditions and their hearts, too; and let Boston
and the world know, that He hath no respect of persons; and that bulwark of
envy, pride, scorn and contempt, which is so visible to be seen in some and felt,
shall fall, to rise no more.'
Interweaving biblical references with allusions to contemporary conditions of
unrest and social change in Haiti, the injunction to his audience to empathize
with the experiences of enslaved black people hints at the possibility that the
recently improved situation for blacks in parts of the West Indies could occur
in Boston as well. There is no overt suggestion that such change should occur
by violence. But the critique of the slave trade is undisguised, heightened rhe-
torically by the figurative use of "iron hand," and the image of being "dragged"
from one's homeland (both recalling language in the slave petitions of the
1770s),"' and an arresting use of antithesis ("tender mercies are cruel," "death,
as a friend")."
Invoking biblical precedent of interactions between white and black
people, and using repetition and parallel construction of a series of sentences
for emphasis,"3 Hall inferred, in lawyerly fashion, that the degradation of
blacks was not based on history or inherent condition:
The great law-giver, Moses, who instructed by his father-in-law, Jethro, an
Ethiopian, how to regulate his courts of justice and what sort of men to choose
194
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for the different offices; ... So Moses hearkened to the voice of his father-in-law,
and did all that he said. Exodus xviii, 22-24... So our Grand Master, Solomon,
was not asham'd to take the Queen of Sheba by the hand, and lead her into his
court at the hour of high twelve, and there converse with her on points of
masonry... our Grand Master Solomon did not divide the living child, what-
ever he might do with the dead one, neither did he pretend to make a law to for-
bid the parties from having free intercourse with one another, without the fear
of censure, or be turned out of the synagogue." 4
Then, invoking metaphor to underline the precarious position of free black
people in Boston at that time (carrying their "lives in their hands" as the
"arrows of death" flew about their heads), juxtaposed to a hoped-for future of
change, Hall stated the factual basis for his complaint of mistreatment with the
specificity of a legal pleading:
Patience I say, for were we not possess'd of a great measure of it you could not
bear up under the daily insults you meet with in the streets of Boston; much
more on public days of recreation, how at such times you are shamefully abus'd,
and that at such a degree that you may truly be said to carry your lives in your
hands, and the arrows of death are flying about your heads; helpless old women
have their clothes torn off their backs... My brethren, let us not be cast down
under these and many other abuses we at present labour under: for the darkest
is before the break of day.115
By adjuring his Masonic fraters to forebear present indignities, and appealing
to them to cultivate a sense of moral rectitude and superiority vis-a-vis white
people, Hall adopted a familiar stance among black writers in the late eigh-
teenth century,"6 and used legal discursive modes to summon up these abuses
with precise detail and vivid imagery:
My brethren, let us remember what a dark day it was with our African brethren
six years ago, in the French West-Indies. Nothing but the snap of the whip was
heard from morning to evening, hanging, broken on the wheel, burning, and all
manner of tortures were inflicted on those unhappy people for nothing else but
to gratify their masters pride, wantoness, and cruelty: but blessed be God, the
scene is changed, they now confess that God hath no respect of persons, and
therefore receive them as their friends, and treat them as brothers. Thus doth
Ethiopia begin to stretch forth her hand, from a sink of slavery to freedom and
equality."7
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We can almost hear the snap of the whip in a passage that is interlaced with
recognizable paraphrasing of language from the Acts of the Apostles (God is
no respecter of persons) " ' and the Declaration of Independence ("train of
abuses and usurpations"). " 9
The genius of Hall's production was its highly nuanced character. Although
unstable at times, it cohered through his deft manipulation of text, theme, and
tone. In scope and sophistication, Hall's work demonstrated literary merit,
operating on several textual levels. Most obviously it bore the earmarks of a
hortatory address designed to inspire and edify through the use of examples,
biblical allusions, and positive reinforcement. At the same time, this reli-
giously pitched language had a lawyerly cast, reflecting not only commonali-
ties between these discursive modes but also the legacy of Revolutionary-era
legal culture and Hall's own participation in creating its rhetoric of argument
and complaint. The language of complaint in Hall's work was never sustained,
and it was often subtle, but the attentive reader or listener of that period would
not miss its applicability to current events, nor mistake the ways in which
Hall's rhetorical craft, his controlled but critical voice, drew attention to the
intractability of racial prejudice in late eighteenth-century Boston. Focusing
on the period in which Hall was active, Dorothy Porter used the term "spokes-
men" to refer to individuals who gave voice to the grievances and aspirations
of the black community.2 In the next generation, Stewart and Walker would
serve a similar function. Hall's collection of orations provided a point of depar-
ture for the more polemical writing of these authors, his cultural successors in
the early nineteenth century.
The years intervening between Prince Hall's generation and the first stir-
rings of abolitionism as a broader movement in the 182os produced new evi-
dence of the extent of whites' resistance to racial inclusion, and solidified the
beginnings of a national strategy by blacks to achieve equality. 2' The founding
in 18 16 of the American Society for Colonizing the Free People of Colour of the
United States inaugurated an extended public debate about the merits of free
blacks emigrating to Africa as an alternative to racial integration in the United
States,'22 engaging ideas broached more than thirty years earlier in Thomas
Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia.'" Certainly some members of the black
community favored emigration.'24 However, many blacks opposed in principle
the efforts of white Americans to dictate the terms under which African "col-
onization" would occur.2 5 Out of this opposition there emerged a body of
protest literature designed to reach a national audience. 26 In the generation
McArdle - The Confluence of Law and Antebellum Black Literature
following Hall, David Walker launched a call for solidarity and resistance in
his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, a provocative discourse of chal-
lenge published in 1829. Claiming Walker as an exemplar, lecturer Maria
Stewart marshaled a vigorous rhetoric in a series of hortatory addresses writ-
ten and delivered in Boston during the early 183os. The second half of this ar-
ticle examines Walker's and Stewart's use of "lawyerly" prose as a dominant
cultural strategy.
"ENLIGHTEN US AND TREAT US LIKE MEN" 127:
DAVID WALKER'S PROVOCATION
Born in the South, Walker settled in Boston in the early- to mid-1820s, worked
as a seller of used cloth, and became active in the anticolonizationist and aboli-
tionist movements.' An engaged member of the Methodist May Street
Church led by the ardent anti-slavery advocate Samuel Snowden, 2' Walker
affiliated himself with organizations that promoted solidarity and antislavery
sentiment, including the Prince Hall Masons and the Massachusetts General
Colored Association (MGCA) 3 ° Walker also supported the publication of
Freedom s Journal, reputedly the nation's first black newspaper, and served as
one of its agents. 3' An issue from December 1828 featured a speech that
Walker had given that same month to the MGCA membership. Sounding a
theme of self-help, the tenor of the quoted language would become a rallying
cry in the Appeal: "Shall we keep slumbering on, with our arms completely
folded up, exclaiming every now and then, against our miseries, yet never do
the least thing to ameliorate our condition, or that of posterity?"'32
Walker's Appeal was an outgrowth, if not a culmination, of black reform
efforts in the late 182os, including the anticolonizationist mission of Freedom s
Journal, the antislavery campaigns of the Prince Hall Masons, and the work of
the MGCA to unify blacks and organize at the national level.'33 The debut of
Freedom sJournal and Walker's own emergence in the North in the late 182os
as consciousness-raiser, political mobilizer, and advocate among black people
were seen as an important "institutional" moment in the "Great Tradition of
Black Protest."'34 This moment made salient the multileveled ways in which lan-
guage functioned to steel black people for the continuing struggle against dehu-
manization.' Walker's impassioned appeal, less tempered than the Journal's
"quiet, sound advocacy," 3" was both an invitation to black people, enslaved and
free, to overcome their subordinated status, and a reproach for their complic-
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ity in their own oppression.3 7 The Appeal's excoriating critique of American
legal, religious, and educational institutions and its refutation of claims of
blacks' racial inferiority would be read, it was hoped, by (or to) enslaved
blacks.' For these reasons, the Appeal prompted concern among Southerners
who feared its capacity to incite a rebellion.139
The Literary Framing of the Appeal: Irony, Parody,
and Intertextuality
Engaging the realm of thought as well as action, Walker wanted the Appeal
to counter the influence of Thomas Jefferson's statements in Notes on the State
of Virginia denigrating blacks' intellectual capacities. 4 Responding to a set of
inquiries posed by France on the physical and political characteristics of the
American continent, Notes served more generally as an early expression of
American exceptionalism, an attempt to project, in Robert Ferguson's terms,
a "sense of country." 4' Jefferson set out his conclusions on the condition and
potential of blacks as part of query 14 of the Notes. His ideas were nuanced,
encompassing the view that slavery was morally problematic, contrary to the
values animating the American Revolution; that Virginia slaveholders seemed
prepared to act on that view (an unwarrantedly optimistic assessment); and
that, if slavery continued, a violent race war might ensue. 42 At the same time,
Jefferson believed that whites and blacks could not coexist in the new republic,
noting "with great diffidence" the deficiencies among blacks in reasoning,
imagination, and physical appearance that made them incompatible with
whites.43 As Henry Louis Gates has demonstrated, Jefferson's view that black
intellectual work lacked originality and was "imitative" of white models was
an Enlightenment-era theme that had appeared earlier in the eighteenth cen-
tury, notably in the writings of Immanuel Kant and David Hume.'
Covering "[t]he administration of justice and description of the laws,' the
response to query 14 summarized proposed laws for Virginia's newly formed
state government. 41 One of the proposals would free all slaves born after the
law's adoption and deport them from Virginia. Despite Jefferson's own pro-
fessed abhorrence of slavery as an institution, and his call for its abolition, he
was opposed to racial integration. 46 Instead, he cited practical reasons favor-
ing an enforced emigration: biases among whites, blacks' consciousness of
injury, and the "real distinctions which nature has made." 147 Walker's efforts to
rebut Jefferson's conclusion of blacks' inferiority was the organizing principle
for the first article of the Appeal.
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Jefferson's influence informed the methodology as much as the substance of
the Appeal. For example, Walker's article 2 offered a systematic "development
of facts"' 48 instantiating defections and deceptions within the black commu-
nity,'49 in the manner of Jefferson's fact-intensive studies in Notes on the State of
Virginia.' And if, in organizational structure, the Appeal bore a surface resem-
blance to the United States Constitution, featuring a preamble and four arti-
cles of argument (slavery, ignorance, preachers of the Christian religion, and
the colonization plan, respectively), 5' in format and tone the Appeal seemed
more akin to another Jeffersonian composition, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. This resemblance occurs most markedly in article 4, which elaborates a
set of grievances; 52 asserts rights to freedom and personhood ("For you must
remember that we are men as well as they");5 3 and justifies violent means, if
necessary, to achieve them ("[I]t is no more harm for you to kill a man, who is
trying to kill you, than it is to take a drink of water when thirsty").'54 Walker's
informed use of key texts from the American legal canon thus served as orga-
nizing principle, discursive method, and substantive theme. His intertextual
referencing of Jefferson's work entailed an ironic and parodic revision that
exemplifies what Henry Louis Gates would describe as the literary trope of
"signifying," a "metaphor for Afro-American formal revision," which pro-
ceeds ironically, playing upon the audience's expectations, and by "evoking
presence by absence through indirection.'55
Throughout the Appeal, Walker addressed black and white Americans in
turn on the inevitability that blacks would achieve freedom, even if by violent
means.5 6 The preamble is illustrative. In addition to white Christians, he sin-
gled out black Americans who, out of ignorance or complacency, did not want
to disturb the status quo.' Anticipating an attempt by "the jealous ones
among us" to argue that it would be pointless for blacks to seek improvement,
he posed a series of questions to preempt that argument:
Can our condition be any worse? Can it be more mean and abject? if there are
any changes, will they not be for the better, though they may appear for the
worst at first? Can they get us any lower? Where can they get us? They are
afraid to treat us worse, for they know well, the day they do it they are gone.58
The vigor of the language, the concatenation of questions, and the incorpora-
tion of antithesis ("will they not be for the better, though they may appear for
the worst") achieved a sense of urgency and persistence that resonated with
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Revolutionary-era petitions. And although Walker directed his questions to
the inertia of the black community, there was an unmistakable challenge to
white Americans embedded in the interrogative structure of the passage.
Walker invoked a "God of justice" against those who were in complicity
with slaveholding: "Will he not cause the very children of the oppressors to
rise up against them, and of times put them to death?"' 5 9 In a deft rhetorical
turn, he evoked an aura of danger by purporting not to discuss it: "I will not
speak of the destructions which the Lord brought upon Egypt... of the hun-
dreds and thousands of Egyptians whom God hurled into the Red Sea for
afflicting his people in their land." 60 Walker followed with a series of questions
which, with increasing emotional intensity, dramatized the injustice of slavery
and the inevitable consequences for the enslavers, by exposing the logical
inconsistency in supposing a just God would permit slavery: "Is not God a
God of justice to all his creatures? Do you say he is? Then if he gives peace
and tranquility to tyrants, and permits them to keep our fathers, our mothers,
ourselves and our children in eternal ignorance and wretchedness, to support
them and their families, would he be to us a God of justice?"'' The pointed
questioning, the menacing undertones, and the resort to logical argument in
the fashion of lawyerly advocacy were pervasive in the Appeafs four articles.
Article 1: Historical Argument and Lawyerly Reasoning
Addressing slavery in its American application, Walker demonstrated in ar-
ticle i that the position of blacks in America was more vexed than that of any
enslaved people in world history, beginning with the Israelites in Egypt:
I call upon the professing Christians ... to show me a page of history... which
maintains, that the Egyptians heaped the insupportable insult upon the children
of Israel, by telling them that they were not of the human family. Can the whites
deny this charge? Have they not, after having reduced us to the deplorable con-
dition of slaves under their feet, held us up as descending originally from the tribes
of Monkeys or Orang-Outangs? ... Has Mr. Jefferson declared to the world,
that we are inferior to the whites, both in the endowments of our bodies and our
minds?.62
More than the exploitation of black labor, then, it was the dehumanizing of
black people that, for Walker, rendered enslavement galling beyond measure.
As noted, Walker ascribed much of the responsibility for the bestializing of
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blacks in the American imagination to Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia.
Applying techniques of lawyerly argumentation, Jefferson had cited evidence of
intellectual accomplishment among certain white slaves in Rome, and the appar-
ent absence of similar achievement among black slaves in America. This evi-
dence, Jefferson argued, supported his "suspicion" that the degraded position
of blacks in America was not attributable to the institution of slavery but to the
limitations of "nature."163 Recognizing that Jefferson's influence would ensure
that his views would not "pass away into oblivion unobserved by this people
and the world," '64 Walker was concerned that Jefferson's conclusions would
prove a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, it was not enough that Jefferson's views
were challenged by "white friends"; 6 ' Walker was "after those who know and
feel, that we are MEN, as well as other people; to them, I say, that unless we try
to refute Mr. Jefferson's arguments respecting us, we will only establish diem." 6
There had been occasional efforts among African Americans to do so, in
addresses to the New York African Society,167 but Walker's refutation was the
most extended and the most publicized. 6 ' Taking up his own challenge, Walker
rejected Jefferson's basis for analogizing enslaved blacks to the slaves of Rome:
Every body who has read history, knows, that as soon as a slave among the Romans
obtained his freedom, he could rise to the greatest eminence in the State..
Have not the Americans instituted laws to hinder us from obtaining our free-
dom? ... Further: have not the Americans instituted laws to prohibit a man of
colour from obtaining and holding any office whatever, under the government
of the United States of America?'69
Adopting Jefferson's own lawyerly method, Walker turned the language of
Jefferson's strained ratiocination against itself. Cataloguing the "hellish cruel-
ties" of white Christians in the slave trade, Walker concluded the article with
an ironic echo of Jefferson's words in Notes: "I therefore.., advance my sus-
picion of them [whites] whether they are as good by nature as we are or not." 7 °
In a "motivated repetition" 7' of Jefferson's own rhetorical structures, Walker's
"suspicion" played on a white text in a way that "functions to redress an
imbalance of power."'72
Articles 2 and 3: The Uses of Emotion
Walker shifted tactics in article 2 (examining the effects of ignorance) with a
challenge to his black readership, arguing that "groveling submissions and
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treachery" within the black community tended to validate Jefferson's assess-
ment)73 Intensifying the rhetoric of menace, Walker suggested that, if suffi-
ciently provoked by the abuses of white Americans, "our natural enemies," "174
blacks in America would give vent to long-dormant impulses, and respond
with equivalent ferocity:
[T]here is an unconquerable disposition in the breasts of the blacks, which,
when it is fully awakened and put in motion, will be subdued, only with the
destruction of the animal existence. Get the blacks started, and if you do not
have a gang of tigers and lions to deal with, I am a deceiver of the blacks and of
the whites ... if you commence, make sure work ... they want us for their
slaves, and think nothing of murdering us in order to subject us to that wretched
condition-therefore, if there is an attempt made by us, kill or be killed.175
Heightening a sense of estrangement from white American society-which,
from the perspective of Walker and his audience, functioned here as the irrec-
oncilable other-Walker, as Maria Stewart would do soon thereafter in Reli-
gion and the Pure Principles of Morality,' stoked a sense of aggrievement as a
way of fostering solidarity among blacks.
As Walker imagined it, blacks would not merely be agents of divine retri-
bution but more active participants, initiators in a confrontation with white
America. Certainly, Walker complicated his message by couching his counsel
to "kill or be killed" in conditional terms: his advice applied "if there is an
attempt made." Still, the passage seemed to valorize an initiatory act of vio-
lence and thus bore the earmarks of incitement. At the same time, Walker his-
torian Peter Hinks suggests the difficulties inherent in reading Walker's lan-
guage and emotional tone monolithically. Walker's "unusually personal form
of exhortation"'77 was equally an effort, Hinks concludes, to effect a "social and
psychological excavation" '' of the conditions that had subjugated black
people and induced them to identify with a degraded sense of self and possibil-
ity.'79 Hinks opines that Walker purposefully eschewed detached, "'closely rea-
soned" argumentation' in favor of a "highly personalized emotional response"
that would counter Jefferson's rational, systematic orientation.'' Without
denying the emotionality of Walker's words, I would argue that Walker's
charged language is lawyerly because it operates as a deductively reasoned
analysis.82
When Walker turned to the subject of education, the tone of the Appeal
became more hortatory than inflammatory: "You have to prove to the Amer-
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icans and the world, that we are MEN, and not brutes, as we have been repre-
sented, and by millions treated. Remember, to let the aim of your labours
among your brethren, and particularly the youths, be the dissemination of
education and religion."'83 Emphasizing the failure of blacks to pursue "the
substance of learning" rather than its mere form, Walker argued that, even
with access to schooling, true educational attainment among blacks in Amer-
ica was illusory. 84 In a series of tonal shifts, he exposed how the absence of a
substantive education had worked to keep blacks subordinated:
Do you suppose one man of good sense and learning would submit himself,
his father, his mother, wife and children, to be slaves to a wretched man like
himself... No! no! he would cut his devilish throat from ear to ear, and well do
slave-holders know it. The bare flame of educating the coloured people scares
our cruel oppressors almost to death. 85
Using reasoned argumentation, Walker emphasized that knowledge is empow-
ering; for an educated person, there would be no rational basis for acceding to
enslavement. However, in Walker's teleology, access to education accomplished
more than demystification; it would trigger those long-dormant impulses to
violence that would ensure the destruction of those who had participated in
slaveholding.
Walker also indicted the Christian clerical establishment for complicity in
keeping blacks unenlightened. In article 3, Walker excoriated the American
ministry, which, in condoning slavery and discouraging religious practice,
perverted the spirit and the letter of Scripture.'86 Recalling the tonality and
interrogative mode of the Revolutionary-era petitions, Walker constructed a
line of argument from a series of questions, each one building logically from
the preceding inquiry:
What can the American preachers and people take God to be? Do they believe
his words? If they do, do they believe that he will be mocked? Or do they
believe, because they are whites and we are blacks, that God will have respect to
them? Did not God not make us all as it seemed best to himself? What right,
then, has one of Us, to despise another, and to treat him cruel, on account of his
colour, which none, but the God who made it can alter?' 8'
Full of foreboding, Walker combined short, staccato phrasing with anaphora
to simulate the style and emphasis of the spoken discourse of a camp meeting
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preacher, as in this quoted passage: "0 Americans! Americans!! I call God-
I call angels-I call men, to witness, that your Destruction is at hand, and will
be speedily consummated unless you REPENT."' 88
Article 4: Signifying on the Jeffersonian Canon
Walker was at his most venomous in his angry response to the white-sponsored
emigration movement. Questioning the motives of those who encouraged
free blacks to colonize Africa-ostensibly to introduce Western culture and
religion to the African continent in article 4, a dubious Walker discerned a
more invidious design: to keep slaves separated from free blacks, whose pres-
ence among the slave population might encourage slaves to press for freedom.'
In a variation on the "long train of abuses and usurpations" of the Declaration
of Independence, 19 itself a piece of lawyerly advocacy modeled on a bill in
equity,'9' Walker appropriated the conventions of the bill by enumerating acts
of cruelty perpetrated against blacks. 92 As in article i, Walker emphasized that
the most galling of these cruelties was the imputation of inferiority. 93
Walker's opposition in the Appeal to the colonizing plan demonstrated more
aggressively than Prince Hall had done a generation before that the fabled
patience of black Americans had been strained to its limit. Tempered in the cru-
cible of experience, the literature of protest was, in Walker's hands, as forthright
as Hall's production was subtle. Unlike the veiled challenges of Hall's Masonic
addresses, Walker was not inclined to soften the impact of his language:
Remember, Americans, that we must and shall be free and enlightened as you
are, will you wait until we shall, under God, obtain our liberty by the crushing
arm of power? ... enlighten us and treat us like men, and we will like you more
than we do now hate you, and tell us no more about colonization, for America
is as much our country, as it is yours.'94
The rhetorical force and cadence of this extended apostrophe drew in part
from the directness of its language, the skillful deployment of the interroga-
tive and peremptory forms, and the dramatic emphasis achieved through par-
allelism ("America is as much our country, as it is yours") augmented by liter-
ary rhetorical devices-variations in the use of conjunctives ("we must and
shall be free and enlightened"), synecdoche ("the crushing arm of power"),
and antithesis ("we will like you more than we do now hate you"). The threat
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of a violent eruption was pervasive, although his address can be distinguished
from the merely inflammatory by the recourse to reason: it was within the
power of white Americans to avoid a violent confrontation if only they would
behave toward blacks as though they were "men." Failing that, the authority
of God would legitimate any violent eventualities.
Ultimately, Walker turned American political rhetoric against itself, hold-
ing up to scrutiny the text of the Declaration of Independence, the nation's
originary document. In this way, he was able to highlight the continuities
between the Declaration and his own Appeal and the dissonance between
American public rhetoric and practice:
Do you understand your own language? Hear your language, proclaimed to the
world, July 4 th, 1776 "we hold these truths to be self evident that ALL Men
Are Created EQUAL!! that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalien-
able rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness!!"
Compare your own language above, extracted from your Declaration of Indepen-
dence, with your cruelties and murders inflicted by your cruel and unmerciful
fathers and yourselves on our fathers and on us.'95
Concluding with the language of Jefferson, Walker had come full circle.
Acknowledging the vexed relation between Jeffersonian thought and the life
conditions of American blacks, Walker used the texts of the Declaration and
the Notes in ironic counterpoint.
If Walker's recourse to the Declaration was rooted in the liberal values of
eighteenth-century republican thought, Walker's discourse was not repre-
sentative of a bourgeois public sphere but part of a black "counterpublic" that
was critically engaged with liberal thought." 6 Michael Dawson has argued
that the black counterpublic transcends a merely critical stance within liberal-
ism but encompasses other perspectives, including nationalism and an empha-
sis on community over the individual, which thus distinguishes it from the
eighteenth-century bourgeois public described by Habermas.197 Walker's dis-
course typifies this complexity of black publicity, which cannot be reduced to
an embrace of liberalism. Although he does hold up the liberal values at the
core of the Declaration of Independence, throughout the Appealhe cultivated
a black audience as distinct from (white) Americans, addressing blacks as
members of a shared community, to which individuals were accountable. 9
In fact, Walker's point was to amplify dissonances: the ostensible inclusive-
ness of the Declaration, whose values had come to animate black people in the
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decades after the Revolution,'99 stood in marked contrast to Jefferson's assess-
ments in Notes that blacks were incapable by nature of incorporating these cher-
ished values in their own lives. Here, again, Walker's deliberate juxtaposition
of Jefferson's words signified on texts that sought to mark (white) Americans
as exceptional. Using parody and a "black authorial stance" to disrupt Jeffer-
son's conclusions of blacks' inferiority,"' Walker's appropriation/revision of
Jefferson's terms demonstrated a "complex attitude towards attempts at dom-
ination, which can be transcended in and through language."2 '' By referenc-
ing and reasoning from texts that served as touchstones of American legal
and political thought, Walker adopted lawyerly methods of precedent-based
discursive analysis.
Walker died only a year after the Appeal was published, under circum-
stances that many considered suspicious.2 ' Whether or not the virulence of
his writing became the occasion for his early death, the pamphlet's impact on
the American public was swift.203 Widely read in the North, the Appeal was
disseminated through the Southern coastal region with the assistance of black
(and some white) sailors and ship's crewmen from Boston. 24 An underground
system of circulation and the practice of reading aloud to groups of illiterate
slaves extended the Appeal's reach.25 The Appeal was believed to have sparked
slave resistance in North Carolina in 0830, abetted by clergy or other, self-styled
men of God from the region. 26 In response, authorities in Georgia and North
Carolina placed free blacks arriving on ships in quarantine during their stay in
the South. Georgia adopted a law forbidding the teaching of reading or writing
to free or enslaved blacks, and North Carolina and Louisiana passed similar
laws that applied to slaves. Georgia, North Carolina, and Mississippi criminal-
ized the circulation of works with an anti-slavery message. Persons suspected
of distributing the Appeal in Charleston, South Carolina, and New Orleans
were arrested.2 7 The mayor of Savannah asked Boston's Mayor Otis to seize
the pamphlet and thus stymie its circulation. Although he had publicly disap-
proved of the Appeal's message, Otis replied that Walker had breached no
state law that would justify such an extreme measure.2 8
Posthumously, Walker's work received respectful treatment in William
Lloyd Garrison's Liberator,"9 and Walker is credited with influencing the
structure and approach of Garrison's own book, Thoughts on African Coloniga-
tion, in which Garrison turned the public rhetoric of the American Coloniza-
tion Society into the basis for his critique of the Society's stance.2' Whether
Walker's Appeal was a catalyst for Nat Turner's slave rebellion in Virginia in
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1831 is unknowable, although historian Vincent Harding has emphasized that
Turner was driven by the same consciousness of a providential force that ani-
mated the Appeal.11 As the abolitionist movement gained in momentum,
Walker's sense of aggrievement and call to action were invoked in Henry
Highland Garnet's inflammatory "Address to the Slaves of the United States,'
delivered at the Negro Convention in Buffalo, New York in 1843, and pub-
lished five years later with the Appeal.'2 With its vigorous language and pas-
sionate tone, the Appealhelped to illuminate a more extensive range of expres-
sive possibilities for black literature that resonated among antebellum writers
as well as among black intellectuals in the late nineteenth century and the
twentieth century.'
"COME LET US PLEAD OUR CAUSE BEFORE THE
WHITES": MARIA STEWART'S LAWYERLY PROSE 214
An early figure in the black feminist tradition,"' and recognized as the first
American woman to give a public political lecture to a mixed audience of men
and women,216 Maria Stewart worked within the framework of David Walker's
call for solidarity and self-help.217 In her abbreviated public career in Boston,
uncommon as it was at that time for a woman, and, in particular, a black
woman,2 1 Stewart emphasized, as Walker had, that education and self-
improvement were essential for blacks to achieve genuine progress.219 Stewart
also carried forward Walker's vigorous idiom and tonality of challenge. Both
Stewart and Walker used the characteristic features of the black jeremiad,
combining Old Testament allusions with reasoned argumentation and admo-
nition,"' and both manipulated the conventions of the spoken address.22' For
all of these reasons, Stewart occupies a place on the rhetorical continuum
between Hall and Walker, although closer to Walker.
Widowed after three years of marriage to a local businessman who had
served in the War of 18 12,222 Stewart addressed middle-class black audiences in
a series of lectures before sororal and fraternal societies. 23 The publication of
her tract Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality, by William Lloyd Garri-
son, and the re-publication of her addresses in Garrison's Liberator, secured a
public forum for her ideas about self-help, the need for education, and the cor-
rosive effects of racism. 24 A person of strong religious faith, Stewart drew
liberally on biblical sources.2 5 Emphasizing education, she urged her black
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audience to cast off passivity and "turn their attention to knowledge and
improvement; for knowledge is power." '226 Only through such steps, she rea-
soned, would it be possible to demonstrate their cultural integrity and consti-
tute themselves as a people.227 She issued challenges-to the black community
as well as whites-and recurred to the Revolutionary-era discourse of rights.
By encouraging her audience to plead causes and assert rights, Stewart rein-
forced the rhetorical practices associated with a legal culture-seeking the
redress of grievances through legal institutions.
Thus, Stewart's writing resonated with the discursive traditions of the law
as much as those of religion. The concluding section of Religion and the Pure
Principles of Morality, her first major work, is illustrative:
Possess the spirit of independence. The Americans do, and why should not you?
Possess the spirit of men, bold and enterprising, fearless and undaunted. Sue for
your rights and privileges. Know the reason that you cannot attain them. Weary
them with your importunities. You can but die if you make the attempt; and we
shall certainly die if you do not.2
Here, Stewart demonstrated her own recourse to the modalities and rhetoric
of the law. Exhorting and expostulating with the black community, she com-
bined a peremptory tone, vigorous idiom, and rhythmic repetition of lan-
guage in the tradition of spoken performance"-a tradition equally conso-
nant with religious preaching23 and lawyerly persuasion. In this way, she
emphasized the importance of strategies for self-improvement, and the need
for solidarity:
The Americans have practised nothing but head-work these 200 years, and we
have done their drudgery. And is it not high time for us to imitate their examples,
and practise head-work too, and keep what we have got, and get what we can?
We need never to think that anybody is going to feel interested for us, if we do
not feel interested for ourselves.23
Modeling the practice of legal argumentation, she combined an appeal to logic
with an artful use of cadence and repetition ("keep what we have got, and get
what we can," "interested for us/interested for ourselves"). Here, the medium
itself had merged with the message.
This melding of expressive medium and content was characteristic of
Stewart's approach. In a series of hortatory addresses delivered in Boston
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during the early I83os, Stewart adopted a discourse of rights as both the sub-
stantive basis for equality of treatment for blacks and the rhetorical mode of
her address. In a lecture at Franklin Hall, the venue for meetings of the New
England Anti-Slavery Society, Stewart took up the anticolonizationist cause in
the language of legal assertion:
I observed a piece in the Liberator a few months since, stating that the coloniza-
tionists had published a work respecting us, asserting that we were lazy and idle.
I confute them on that point. Take us generally as a people, we are neither lazy
nor idle; and considering how little we have to excite or stimulate us, I am almost
astonished that there are so many industrious and ambitious ones to be found...
Again, it was asserted that we were "a ragged set, crying for liberty." I reply to
it, the whites have so long and so loudly proclaimed the theme of equal rights
and privileges that our souls have caught the flame also, ragged as we are.232
Signifying on the language quoted from the Liberator, Stewart identified the
source of the cries for liberty in "the whites." Invoking Revolutionary-era dis-
course, and savoring the irony, she linked the calls of blacks for equality to
white colonists' demands for "equal rights." She appropriated and revised
"ragged set," used in white discourse as an appellation of contempt, to high-
light that "ragged" blacks, no less than whites, were animated by the prospect
of possessing rights.
"Confuting" and "replying" to the assertions of white colonizationists,
Stewart, as Prince Hall had done, used repetition in framing the interrogative
mode to develop a reasoned analysis of the importance of self-help:
Did the pilgrims, when they first landed on these shores, quietly compose them-
selves and say, "The Britons have all the money and all the power, and we must
continue their servants forever?" Did they sluggishly sigh and say, "Our lot is
hard, the Indians own the soil, and we cannot cultivate it?" No; they first made
powerful efforts to raise themselves, and then God raised up those industrious
patriots, WASHINGTON and LAFAYETTE, to assist and defend them. And
my brethren, have you made a powerful effort? Have you prayed the legislature
for mercy's sake to grant you all the rights and privileges of free citizens, that
your daughters may rise to that degree of respectability which true merit
deserves, and your sons above the servile stations which most of them fill?"'
Repeating "raising" and "powerful effort," Stewart shifted from the language
of rights assertion to the substance of the rights inherent in the status of "free
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citizens." Stewart similarly underlined the theme of substantive rights in an
address delivered the following year at the African Masonic Hall, using pat-
terns of couplets ("fear/servitude," "force/energy," "nobly/boldly") and
repetition of language for emphasis:
Continual fear and laborious servitude have in some degree lessened in us that
natural force and energy which belongs to man; or else, in defiance of opposi-
tion, our men, before this, would have nobly and boldly contended for their rights.
But give the man of color an equal opportunity with the white from cradle to
manhood, and from manhood to the grave, and you would discover the digni-
fied statesman, the man of science, and the philosopher. But there is no such
opportunity for the sons of Africa, and I fear that our powerful ones are fully
determined that there shall never be ... 0, ye sons of Africa, when will your
voices be heard in our legislative halls, in defiance of your enemies, contending
for equal rights and liberty?234
Urging her audience to pursue temperance and education, and "contend for
the cause of God and rights of man," Stewart linked the issue of equal oppor-
tunity to a capacity to assert these natural rights: "Had we as a people received
one-half the early advantages the whites have received, I would defy the gov-
ernment of the United States to deprive us any longer of our rights."235 Echo-
ing Walker's more ominous tones as well as his use of the theme of providence,
Stewart held out the prospect that blacks will "have their rights; and if refused,
I am afraid they will spread horror and devastation around... and when our
cries shall have reached the ears of the Most High it will be a tremendous day
for the people of this land, for strong is the hand of the Lord God Almighty."'211
Embedding the recourse to rights within a tradition of providential deliver-
ance, Stewart's approach recalled Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality.
Forecasting a disastrous end to white domination in language richly resonant
with the Bible, Stewart alluded, as she did throughout her work, to the Old
Testament (the reference to the ten plagues) and to New Testament sources
(the forecast of destruction invoking the tone and imagery of the Book of
Revelations):237
Oh, America, America, foul and indelible is thy stain! Dark and dismal is the
cloud that hangs over thee, for thy cruel wrongs and injuries to the fallen sons
of Africa. The blood of her murdered ones cries to heaven for vengeance against
thee ... You may kill, tyrannize, and oppress as much as you choose, until our
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cry shall come up before the throne of God; for I am firmly persuaded, that he
will not suffer you to quell the proud, fearless and undaunted spirits of the Afri-
cans forever; for in his own time, he is able to plead our cause against you, and
to pour out upon you the ten plagues of Egypt.23t
Melding legal and religious traditions, the divine intervention she imagined
was the "speech act"239 of a lawyer pleading the cause of the black community.
Recognizing that lawyers' language, in speech-act terms, is always subject
to being disrupted, questioned, and contested, legal pleaders must use a vari-
ety of techniques that can convey, imply-and even allow for a retreat from-
a particular meaning.240 Stewart's language suggests this lawyerly multireso-
nance. Despite undeniable moments of menace in the passage, Stewart
cloaked this challenge to white Americans in biblical terms with which her
readership-white and black-would be well familiar: her dire forebodings
reflected the righteous anger of an avenging God, of which there was ample
warning in Scripture. 4 By this rhetorical distancing, Stewart was able to
modulate the threatening potential of her language, and deflect direct respon-
sibility for any violent eventuality from the black community.
In this respect, Stewart's work recalls, in a more developed form, Prince
Hall's use of subtlety and irony in engaging a critique of white society. How-
ever, Stewart's language and tonality, more consistently than Hall's, commu-
nicated tenacity and forthrightness, placing her squarely within the conven-
tions of advocacy. Her expression solidified the connection between black
cultural production and legal discourse suggested in Hall's addresses. And if
Stewart's work never reached the level of virulence of Walker's polemics, the
continuities between their production were marked. Stewart closed the public
portion of her career after only three years. This quotation from her farewell
address in 1833 suggests some of the difficulties she faced as a black woman in
the public sphere: "Had experience more plainly shown me that it was the
nature of man to crush his fellow, I should not have thought it so hard. Where-
fore, my respected friends, let us no longer talk of prejudice till prejudice
becomes extinct at home. Let us no longer talk of opposition, till we cease to
oppose our own."242
She spent the next forty years as a teacher, in New York, Brooklyn, Balti-
more, and Washington, D.C., and in the 187Os worked as a matron, and, in
effect, an exemplar, in the Freedman's Hospital in Washington, as Sojourner
Truth had done at another Freedman's facility.243 In 1879, the year of her death,
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Stewart used the proceeds of a widow's pension to subsidize the publication of
a new edition of her writings, augmented by an account of her later years.244
The volume was introduced by correspondence from friends and public figures,
including her former publisher, William Lloyd Garrison, who recalled that
her "whole adult life has been devoted to the noble task of educating and ele-
vating your people, sympathizing with them in their affliction, and assisting
them in their needs."2 45
Rhetorically, Stewart served as a link to abolitionist discourse of the 183os
and I84os, a discourse that increasingly recurred to the language of rights and
legal pleading. This included Hosea Easton's lawyerly argument, written in
1837, deriving a basis for equal civil rights for blacks in the "original agree-
ment of the contracting parties"-the severing of relations with Britain, and
the loss of a basis in law for recognizing slavery-and the citizenship rights
articulated in the Declaration of Independence; 241 Frederick Douglass's asser-
tion of rights on behalf of black people in the inaugural edition of his news-
paper, the North Star, in 1847 ("[The North Star] shall fearlessly assert your
rights, faithfully proclaim your wrongs and earnestly demand for you instant
and evenhanded justice."); 247 and William Watkins's petition to a Massachusetts
legislative committee seeking a charter for an independent black military unit:
"WHY SHOULD THIS PETITION BE GRANTED? It should be granted
because the request is a reasonable one, and one emanating from a body of men who
have an absolute right to demand it... We are men, and we wish to be treated, as
men in the land of the Pilgrims should be treated.... Give us our rights."2 48
A pathbreaking public rhetor, Maria Stewart's contributions to black aboli-
tionist discourse secured its association with the lawyerly features that were so
serviceable to a project of protest and assertion of rights.
CONCLUSION: "WHAT IS THE ROLE OF
THE (LAWYER'S) WORD?" 249
In the formative years of the national abolitionist movement, Prince Hall,
David Walker, and Maria Stewart produced texts that invoked Revolutionary-
era discursive traditions of public legal challenges to slavery and racial in-
equality-strategic marshalling of facts, use of narrative, reasoned elucidation
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of argument, questioning of the status quo, and a characteristic tonality of
challenge. Each understood that the law's primacy as a category for ordering
social relations, and its claim to moral authority, gave its forms and expressive
practices a distinct rhetorical value. The law's discursive method offered a par-
adigm for cultural expression because its language was so completely impli-
cated in the substantive rights that the law purported to guarantee. In using
law's public language as a literary practice, early black abolitionist discourse
drew attention to the gulf between precept and practice, and articulated the ra-
tionale for changing that practice. In black Americans' aspiration to achieve
(even formal) equality under law, the lawyer's word offered a rhetoric of em-
powerment, a way of naming, and overcoming, their experience of irony.
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